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This paper develops a dynamic model of an economy with search fric-
tions in which homogeneous agents choose between specializing as pro-
ducers or as merchants, and can change occupation at any time. Mer-
chants operate alongside a decentralized search market and provide im-
mediacy in trade in return for a price. Agents who know the location of
a merchant have the option of paying the merchant’s price and avoid-
ing search. We characterize equilibria in symmetric Markov strategies,
and derive conditions under which merchants and their clients form a
repeated relationship. We analyze welfare and explore conditions for
the endogenous rise of an institution of intermediation.
Keywords: Search, endogenous intermediation, repeated interaction.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D02, D51, D83.
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Merchants and traders—agents who mediate the transfer of goods and
services between producers and consumers—are central to the economic
process. Specialization, the source of the wealth of nations, cannot pro-
ceed unless some agents mediate exchange. Thus Hicks, who considered
the merchant trader the “principal character” in economic history, wrote
that “it is specialization upon trade that is the beginning of the new world”
(Hicks, 1969, p.25). In an economy with any degree of specialization, agents
must trade to acquire goods that they wish to consume in exchange for
goods that they produce. Searching for trading partners can be costly and
time-consuming. Some agents recognize that there is proﬁt in facilitating
exchange and specialize as intermediaries or merchants. They reduce search
costs and provide immediacy in exchange. Further, merchants derive prof-
its from repeat business with returning clients rather than from random
encounters with one-time clients.
The present paper focuses on these characteristics of the merchant. Our
objective is a parsimonious but self-contained model of the merchant trader
that reﬂects some essential features of an institution of intermediation in its
“early and rude state”. We are especially interested in the prospect of an
endogenous emergence of specialist merchant traders. We establish equilib-
ria in which merchants price their services to encourage repeat business, and
their clients prefer to return to them in future periods rather than search
for other trading partners. We show that such intermediation is proﬁtable
for some ranges of values of critical technological and institutional parame-
ters; in other ranges the economy may harbor brigands but not bona ﬁde
merchants. We fully characterize two classes of intermediation equilibria
that may exist, as well as a class of equilibria with brigandry. In a closed
form example with reasonable search technologies, we show the existence of
a unique equilibrium of each class.
The model is a variant of Diamond’s (1982) tropical island economy. In
our version homogeneous agents choose to specialize as producers or mer-
chants, and can change occupation at any time. In each period a producer
must exchange his output before he can consume. Exchanges are made
with other producers or with merchants—the producer ﬁnds these partners
through search. A merchant sets up a trading post; producers arriving at her
post can trade by paying a commission that the merchant sets each period.
Locating a merchant through search may not be a priori easier than locat-
ing another producer. However, a merchant can predict her own location
from one period to the next, whereas a producer cannot. A producer who
succeeds in ﬁnding a merchant may thus return to her in the next period,
avoiding search. The viability of specialized intermediation is predicated on
the ability of intermediaries to form such ongoing relationships with their
clients.
1Producers sometimes forget the locations of their merchants, so an un-
mediated search market remains active in parallel. A producer may therefore
credibly decline to return to his merchant and choose instead to search anew
for a trading partner. The continued existence of a search market also af-
fords incipient merchants a pool from which they can draw clients. The
process by which a new merchant acquires clients is a part of the dynamics
of the model.
An equilibrium determines the occupational choice of each agent, and
the commissions charged by merchants. We ﬁnd that there are three classes
of equilibria in symmetric Markov strategies. In bandit equilibria, merchants
act as bandits and claim the entire output of their clients as “commission”.
In this case, producers understandably never return to these merchants,
but search for trading partners in each period. This of course bears no
resemblance to an institution of intermediation.1
Of greater interest to us are intermediation equilibria, in which merchants
charge a commission that induces existing clients to return in succeeding
periods. Intermediation equilibria exist only if producers remember the lo-
cation of their merchants with suﬃciently high probability. There are two
distinct classes of intermediation equilibria. In one class, the price charged
by merchants is the highest that is compatible with repeated interaction:
were the price any higher, clients of merchants would be better oﬀ searching
for trading partners each period. In the other class, the price is the lowest
that is compatible with repeated interaction: were the price any lower, mer-
chants would be better oﬀ acting as bandits instead of intermediaries that
encourage clients to return.
An agent who specializes as a merchant facilitates exchange, but does
not produce output. Moreover, as the measure of merchants increases, the
unmediated search market gets thinner. The optimal measure of merchants
in the economy must balance these eﬀects. We ﬁnd that, in general, an equi-
librium is not optimal. We give conditions under which an intermediation
equilibrium improves welfare compared to an economy with no merchants.
Finally, we discuss conditions under which an institution of intermedia-
tion can be expected to arise endogenously when the status quo ante is an
economy with no merchants. We provide a heuristic interpretation of the
parameters in our model in terms of technological and socio-political condi-
tions that determine when intermediation rises and ﬂourishes and when it
declines under threat of brigandry and disorder.
The investigation of the role of intermediaries in speeding up search was
initiated by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987).2 In their model, buyers, sell-
1It is perhaps no accident that, in many historical contexts, merchants and brigands
possessed similar enforcement capabilities. Even today unscrupulous merchants may, if
they choose, defraud an unsuspecting client once with ease.
2Various other functions of intermediaries have been investigated in the literature:
2ers, and intermediaries are randomly matched: trading with an intermediary
is not a choice. In equilibrium, intermediaries are active if buyers and sellers
encounter an intermediary at least as often as they encounter each other.
Gehrig (1993) presents a static model in which buyers and sellers, who
diﬀer in valuations and costs that are private information, can choose to
search for trading partners and negotiate price, or access intermediaries
whose locations and prices are publicly observable. Yavas (1994) allows het-
erogeneous agents to choose the intensity of private search, or to opt for
the service of an intermediary. Spulber (1996) presents a dynamic model
in which buyers, sellers, and intermediaries are heterogeneous in several re-
spects, and intermediaries and their prices have to be found through search;
there is no parallel unmediated search market in which buyers and sellers
can trade directly. The focus is on deriving the equilibrium bid-ask spread
and comparing the outcome with Walrasian prices. Rust and Hall (2003)
extend the model of Spulber (1996) by adding a second type of intermedi-
aries who post publicly observable prices. Howitt (2005) examines the role
of ﬁat money in a search market where merchants organize exchange.
The papers cited above can accommodate rich heterogeneity among
agents, but intermediaries are exogenously present in the economy and do
not choose their calling. In contrast, a key concern of the present paper
is to generate an endogenous distribution of occupational assignments in
equilibrium starting from a homogeneous population.
We are aware of only a few papers that explicitly model endogenous oc-
cupational choice between production and intermediation. Li (1998) does so
in the context of a friction quite diﬀerent from ours: the function of inter-
mediaries is to assess the quality of goods that are traded. In Bhattacharya
and Hagerty (1987), producers may trade only with intermediaries; thus,
the viability of intermediation is never in question. In Hellwig (2002) and
Shevchenko (2004), the role of intermediaries is to resolve the problem of
double coincidence of wants. Intermediaries achieve this by complementing
money in Hellwig’s model, and by stocking a variety of goods in Shevchenko’s
model. In both these models, there is also an unmediated search market, as
in ours. Prices set by intermediaries in Hellwig’s model are publicly observ-
able; terms of trade with an intermediary are determined by Nash bargaining
in Shevchenko’s model.
Our paper is closely related to Masters (2007). Masters also investigates
the endogenous emergence of intermediaries in the context of Diamond’s
tropical island economy. In his model, intermediaries enter the market with
a unit of a good they have acquired after exchange. This gives them an
advantage in Nash bargaining with producers because the intermediary has
the option of consuming the good she holds whereas the producer does not.
He ﬁnds that, when all producers have identical production costs, interme-
Spulber (1999) has an extensive survey.
3diaries uniformly reduce welfare in the economy; however, when production
costs are ex ante unequal intermediation can increase welfare. In contrast,
the advantage of intermediaries in our model comes from the potential of
repeated trade which Masters does not allow. As a consequence, in our
model, intermediation can improve welfare even though all producers face
identical costs (which we normalize to zero).
Intermediaries do not establish durable links with their clients in any of
the papers above. In our paper, the beneﬁt of establishing a trading link
with an intermediary is that search costs can be avoided in future periods.
At any intermediation equilibrium, clients and their merchants form ongoing
relationships.
Durable client relations is accommodated in some papers that investi-
gate price-setting by sellers in a market where consumers search for prices.
The pricing component of the model here is similar to Benabou (1997), but
simpler as our agents are homogeneous while Benabou allows heterogeneous
agents. Burdett and Coles (1997) presents a model of noisy search in which
a searching producer can observe more than one price with positive proba-
bility.
The next section sets out the model. Equilibrium is derived in Sections 3
and 4 for general matching functions. We then adopt a speciﬁc form for the
matching functions in the remainder of the paper. In Section 5 we derive
closed-form characterizations of equilibria of each of class and show these
to be unique. Welfare is analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the
possibility of an endogenous rise of merchants ab initio. Section 8 concludes
with comments. Longer proofs have been placed in the appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Context
The setting is a highly stylized model of production, search, and ex-
change, adapted from Diamond (1982). The economy operates over an
inﬁnite succession of discrete periods. Agents are homogeneous and risk-
neutral; they live for ever; the set of agents is a continuum of unit measure.
Each agent has access to a technology for production that generates one
unit of a homogeneous, divisible good at no cost in each period. A taboo
against consuming the output of one’s own production ensures that exchange
must precede consumption. This artiﬁce allows, within a one-commodity
framework, a representation of the reality that agents in an economy con-
sume very little of their own output and the need for specialization and
trade is paramount.3
3Although the model is in eﬀect one of pure exchange, it will be convenient for termi-
4The search for trading partners has to be undertaken anew after each
episode of production (this may happen, for example, if the pursuit of pro-
duction takes producers to random and unpredictable locations). Thus,
every period each agent sets out to trade his output with any other agent
he may encounter. The probability that a given agent will meet a trading
partner during the period is λ ∈ (0,1). We interpret λ as a measure of the
eﬃcacy of unmediated search.4 Once two agents meet, the units are traded
one for one,5 consumption takes place, and the agents are free to return
to production which will generate another unit of the good next period.
Throughout the paper we assume that untraded good cannot be carried
as inventory.6 Thus, an agent unsuccessful in eﬀecting exchange foregoes
consumption and returns in the next period with a newly produced unit.
We normalize payoﬀs so that the utility of consuming x units in a period
is x. Letting δ ∈ (0,1) represent the common discount factor of the agents,






Is there scope in such a setting for some agents to set up as specialist
intermediaries and oﬀer the service of immediate trade in return for a price?
2.2 Producers and Merchants
We next allow each agent, in every period t, the choice of specializing
either as a producer, or as a merchant. A specialist producer can access
the production technology described above to produce output, but cannot
commit to be available for trade at a speciﬁed location. In contrast, a
specialist merchant cannot produce output, but can commit to be available
for trade at a speciﬁed location. A specialist merchant operates a trading
post where producers can exchange their output. For this service, a merchant
charges a price that she sets each period.7
Agents can switch occupation between periods. At the end of each pe-
riod, each producer may attempt to switch occupation and become a pro-
ducer in the next period, and correspondingly a merchant may attempt
nological clarity to interpret it as a special model with production.
4More generally, 1 − λ may be interpreted as a measure of any transaction cost asso-
ciated with coordinating trades without an organized market. In the language of search
models the transaction cost is a lost trading opportunity.
5As agents are symmetric, any reasonable bargaining solution would prescribe an equal
share of the gains from trade.
6Alternatively, we could assume that production cannot be carried out with a unit of
the good already in hand. What we need is that a producer is not in possession of more
than one unit at any given time.
7Since units are traded one for one in the unmediated search market, the merchant’s
price is also her commission or bid-ask spread.
5to become a producer. A change of occupation, however, is a signiﬁcant
decision that may be temporarily constrained by cost and feasibility consid-
erations. We model this as a friction in the implementation of the decision;
for each given agent the attempt to switch occupations is unsuccessful with
a probability α ∈ (0,1], with realizations identically and independently dis-
tributed across agents and periods. With probability 1 − α ∈ [0,1), the
agent ﬁnds that the decision to change occupation can indeed be imple-
mented in that particular period. In the analysis, this friction rules out a
class of implausible equilibria that are characterized at the end of Section
4. An arbitrarily small positive α is suﬃcient.
A merchant’s location or price is not public information and must be
initially found by a producer during search. Merchants may be peripatetic,
but they are not subject to random displacements in location. A merchant
decides each period where she will locate in the following period and commu-
nicates this information to her clients. Thus, once a producer makes contact
with a merchant, it opens for him the prospect of a long-term relationship
for future trade without further search.
If a producer trades with a merchant in period t, then he learns where
the merchant will locate in period t + 1. With probability γ ∈ (0,1) he
remembers this information at t + 1; with the complementary probability
1 − γ he forgets this information before t + 1. If a producer has not traded
with a merchant in period t, then he does not know the location of any
merchant at t + 1.
The non-persistence of memory embodied in γ ∈ (0,1) is meant to reﬂect
the unavoidable frictions in continuing business relations, perhaps more per-
vasive in a nascent market than in a mature one. For example, the pursuit
of production may take a producer too far from his merchant. In the model
the assumption ensures that an unmediated search market remains viable.
An agent is informed in period t if he knows the location of a merchant’s
trading post at the beginning of t, and uninformed if he does not.
An uninformed producer must search for a trading partner. The search
may yield one of three outcomes in a given period: either he does not meet
a trading partner, or he meets another producer who is also searching, or
he ﬁnds a trading post. If he fails to ﬁnd a partner, he cannot trade. If he
ﬁnds another producer, units are exchanged one for one. If he comes upon
a trading post, he concludes trade at the merchant’s set price, and learns
where the merchant will locate at t + 1.
An informed producer has two options: he may proceed directly to his
merchant’s trading post, pay the merchant’s commission, and immediately
conclude trade; alternatively, he may search anew for a trading partner.
In the latter case, he forsakes the knowledge of his erstwhile merchant and
is exactly in the same position as an uninformed producer. An informed
producer may also return to ﬁnd that her merchant is absent because she has
6switched occupation. Such a producer proceeds to the unmediated search
market as well. We assume that informed producers on their way to a
merchant are unavailable to other producers searching for a partner.
Note that a producer can meet at most one trading partner in a period.
Thus, if he meets a merchant, he may as well trade—regardless of how
adverse the price set by the merchant is—since his current unit of the good
will become obsolete after the present period. However, in equilibrium a
producer will not return to a merchant who oﬀers an unacceptable price
even if he remembers her location in the following period.
Let mt denote the measure of agents who specialize as merchants in pe-
riod t and st denote the measure of producers in the search market. For a
producer who searches for a trading partner, the probability of success is
governed by two matching functions, λm and λs: λm(mt,st) is the proba-
bility that he ﬁnds a merchant and λs(mt,st) the probability that he meets
another producer who is also searching in period t. Thus, the probability
that he is able to trade within the period is given by λm(mt,st)+λs(mt,st).
Throughout the paper we assume that λm (resp. λs) is (weakly) increasing
in m (resp. s); and the following conditions obtain:
λm(m,s) + λs(m,s) ∈ (0,1),
λm(0,1) = 0, λm(m,s) > 0 for m > 0,
λs(0,1) = λ, λs(m,s) > 0 for s > 0.
Note that when m = 0 all agents are producers who search, i.e., s = 1,
which is the primitive economy described in Section 2.1. In what follows,
we often suppress the arguments of the functions λm and λs unless we are
evaluating them at a particular point. No confusion should arise.
Merchants may meet and serve multiple clients within a period. The
clients of a given merchant in a given period t come from two sources: in-
formed clients from period t − 1 who choose to return, and new clients—
producers who discover her trading post during period t in the course of
search. Merchants do not meet other merchants; such meetings are incon-
sequential in this model.
A merchant must start a period with suﬃcient inventory to conduct the
ﬁrst trade. She funds each subsequent trade out of the proceeds of the
previous one. A merchant who plans to set a price pt in period t must
therefore carry from period t−1 an inventory of 1−pt unit to oﬀer her ﬁrst
client at t in return for the client’s single unit.
Since untraded output cannot be carried in inventory, only producers
who have eﬀected an exchange in the previous period can exercise the option
of becoming merchants. A continuing merchant can of course carry inventory
as needed. Thus pricing and occupational choice decisions must be made
one period in advance. An agent who was a producer in t−1 and wishes to
7switch occupation and become a merchant at t must carry over the necessary
inventory by foregoing 1 − pt units of consumption. Correspondingly, a
merchant who decides to switch to production in period t can enjoy an
extra 1 − pt−1 units of consumption in t − 1.
In an alternative formulation, the merchant could be modeled as a market-
maker who organizes exchange between producers. Producers who show up
at her trading post pay a commission to the merchant to trade with each
other. A merchant then would not need to carry inventory between peri-
ods; nor would a new merchant need capital to start up business. Then
all decisions—in particular, occupational choice and pricing—pertaining to
period t could be made at the start of that period. The two formulations
lead to almost identical results with only small diﬀerences in the explicit
expressions for equilibrium values of some variables.
2.3 Solution Concept
The interaction among the agents in this economy over time is modeled as
a stochastic game.8 At the beginning of period t, each agent knows his infor-
mation state—whether he is informed, or uninformed—and his occupation—
a producer or a merchant. The sequence of events unfolds as follows.
At the beginning of period t, Each merchant µ sets a price p
µ
t ∈ [0,1]
which she has decided upon previously. Producers will learn this price only
when (and if) they arrive at the merchant’s post. Each informed producer
(having produced output) decides whether to return to the merchant that
he traded with in the previous period (choice R) or to undertake search
for a trading partner (choice S). An uninformed producer has no option
but to search. Informed producers whose erstwhile merchants have changed
occupation also search. The outcomes of the search processes are realized;
and trade takes place. Each producer who trades with a merchant forgets
where the merchant will locate at t + 1 with probability 1 − γ; the ones
who do not will be the only informed agents in period t + 1. Next, agents
choose their occupation for period t+1. Decisions to change occupation are
implemented subject to the friction α described earlier. Agents who will be
merchants in the following period t+1 choose the prices they will charge in
t + 1. Finally consumption takes place.
For a producer, the period-t (Bernoulli) payoﬀ is 1 if at t he trades with
another producer, 1−pt if he trades with a merchant who charges a price pt,
and 0 if he fails to execute a trade at t. The period-t payoﬀ of a merchant
µ who sets a price p
µ
t and serves k
µ





In any period t, agents have imperfect information of the history of play
up to t. The personal history observed by an agent in period t consists of
8The description here is informal: we do not furnish the measure-theoretic structure
to make it entirely precise; but the details are standard.
8(a) the prices she set and the size of the clientele she served in every period
up to t−1 that she operated as a merchant, (b) the prices he paid in every
period up to t−1 that he was a producer and traded with a merchant, and
(c) the outcome in every period up to t − 1 that he searched for a trading
partner.9
An agent’s strategy is a sequence of functions (indexed by t) that pre-
scribe, for every period t, an action in Ai or Au as a function of the personal
history observed by the agent at t and the agent’s information state at
the beginning of t. We call an agent’s strategy Markov if the sequence of
functions is time-invariant, and if the action it prescribes in period t is de-
termined entirely by the outcomes observed by the agent at t−1 and by the
agent’s information state at the beginning of t. In particular, for a merchant
µ following a Markov strategy, the choice of price at t, p
µ
t , can depend only
on the size of her clientele k
µ
t−1 and her price p
µ
t−1 at t − 1; for an informed
producer following a Markov strategy, the decision of whether to return to
his merchant at t can depend only on the price the merchant had charged
at t − 1.
A proﬁle of Markov strategies is symmetric if the function prescribing
the pricing rule is the same for every merchant and the function prescribing
the return-decision rule is the same for every informed producer. The occu-
pational choice decisions may vary across agents. We look for equilibria in
symmetric Markov strategies that produce steady-state outcomes as deﬁned
below.
Deﬁnition 2.1. An equilibrium is a proﬁle of symmetric Markov strategies
such that, given the strategy choices of other agents,
• the occupational choice of each agent in every period t is optimal;
• the price set by each merchant in every period t maximizes that merchant’s
expected continuation payoﬀ at t;
• for each informed producer, the return decision in every period t maxi-
mizes his expected continuation payoﬀ at t;
• mt = m, st = s for every period t.
We do not a priori restrict an agent’s set of strategies to be symmetric
or Markov. However, we are able to completely characterize only the set of
equilibria in which agents’ strategy choices are symmetric and Markov.
The focus of the paper is the class of equilibria in which each merchant
and her (informed) clients form a repeated relationship: we call these inter-
mediation equilibria.
Deﬁnition 2.2. An intermediation equilibrium with m∗ ∈ (0,1) merchants
is an equilibrium such that an informed producer has no incentive to search
9In particular, a merchant does not observe the identity of an individual customer and
thus cannot give discounts to returning customers. Merchants do not observe the history
of prices set by other merchants. Producers do not observe the client size of any merchant.
9for a trading partner: his (weakly) optimal choice in every period t is to
return to the merchant he had dealt with at t − 1.
2.4 Preliminary Observations
Observation 2.1. It is important to note that the size of the clientele that a
given merchant µ serves in period t, k
µ
t , is stochastic. It is perfectly possible
that most—or even all—of the clients served by a particular merchant at
t−1 forget her location at t. The realization of k
µ
t can vary across merchants
at t, and over time for the same merchant µ.
Observation 2.2. At an intermediation equilibrium, by deﬁnition, only
uninformed producers search. Thus, at an intermediation equilibrium with
m ∈ (0,1) merchants, the expected size of clientele for a given merchant µ,
who had set a price p
µ
t−1 and served k
µ
















where E is the expectation operator. A fraction γ of a merchant’s clients
from period t − 1 retain the knowledge of her location and return to deal
with her. Moreover, each of the s producers in the search market discovers
a merchant with probability λm. Since there are m merchants, the expected
size of searching producers that arrive at the trading post of a given merchant
in any period t is λms/m. This yields equation (2).
The above equation also shows how an incipient merchant—an erstwhile
producer who sets up as a merchant in period t—can start from a base of
k
µ
t−1 = 0 and acquire clients over time.
Observation 2.3. At an intermediation equilibrium with m merchants, the
expected continuation value at t of a merchant µ who sets a constant price










+ V µ(0,p,m). (4)
The ﬁrst term reﬂects the discounted stream of proﬁts from the pool of
returning clients from t − 1: of the kt−1 clients, a fraction γ returns at t, of
whom a fraction γ return at t + 1 and so on. The second term reﬂects the
(time-invariant) continuation value from clients who come upon merchant
µ at t for the ﬁrst time: as argued in Observation 2.2, their measure is
λm(m,s)s/m.




+ δV µ(0,p,m), (5)
so that we have
V µ(0,p,m) =
pλms
(1 − δ)(1 − γδ)m
. (6)
Observation 2.4. At an intermediation equilibrium with m merchants, the
expected measure of searching producers is given by
s = (1 − γ)
 
1 − m − s

+ (1 − γλm
s. (7)
In each period, a fraction (1 − γ) of the (1 − m − s) informed producers
forget the location of their merchants and return as searchers. Of the s
searching producers, a fraction λm discover a merchant’s trading post; of
those, a fraction γ return as informed; all others return as searchers. This
gives (7), which simpliﬁes to
s =
(1 − γ)(1 − m)
1 − γ(1 − λm)
. (8)
The next two sections develop the analysis of the class of equilibria in
which the occupational choices of agents result in a measure m ∈ (0,1) of
merchants.
3 Pricing
In this section, we take a ﬁxed stationary occupational assignment with
m ∈ (0,1) merchants as given, and characterize the sequence of prices that
the merchants set and the decision rules that the informed producers follow
in any equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the occupational choices in equilib-
rium.
In any given period t, a merchant must determine the price to charge,
and an informed producer must correspondingly decide whether to return
to the merchant he dealt with at t−1 or to search for a trading partner. We
want to look for equilibria in which these decisions are based only on the
information observed by the corresponding decision maker in period t − 1.
Moreover, we look for equilibria in which the decision rules of the agents are
time-invariant (by Markov restriction) and symmetric (by assumption).
Thus, in equilibrium, the decision rule of any informed producer can
be represented as a time-invariant partition {PR,PS} of [0,1]: a producer
returns to his merchant in period t if and only if the price charged by that
merchant in period t − 1 was in PR; otherwise, the producer searches for a
trading partner. We refer to this loosely as an informed producer’s return
strategy.
11Lemma 3.1. In any equilibrium, PS is nonempty, and supPS = 1. In an
intermediation equilibrium, if one exists, PR is nonempty, supPR < 1 and
supPR ∈ PR.
Proof. In any period, there are at least (1−γ)(1−m) agents searching. Hence




> 0. Thus, a price greater than 1 − λs 
m,(1 − γ)(1 − m)

cannot be in PR. It follows that
 
1 − λs 






By deﬁnition of an intermediation equilibrium, PR is non-empty. From




If supPR / ∈ PR, then a merchant charging p ∈ PR can increase her cur-
rent period proﬁt by raising her price slightly without aﬀecting the return-
decision of any client.
Our primary interest is in intermediation equilibria with an ongoing re-
lationship between a merchant and her informed clients. First, we dispense
with a case in which all merchants always charge a price of unity and pro-
ducers never return. This is really a description of a search equilibrium with
bandits, not of an institution of intermediation. These bandits live oﬀ ap-
propriating the entire endowments of any searching producers who unluckily
encounter them; the producers obviously do not return to trade with them.
Lemma 3.2 (Bandit Pricing). Each merchant always setting a price of 1
and each producer always choosing to search, even when informed, constitute
mutual best responses for any given measure of merchants.
Proof. Since clients do not return, it is never optimal for a merchant to set
a price below 1. Even if a merchant deviates and sets a price below 1 in
some period, the strategy proﬁle calls for her to revert to a price of 1 in
the following period. Hence, it is never optimal for an informed producer to
return to his merchant.10
The next lemma describes a merchant’s best response to a given (sym-
metric, time-invariant) return strategy PR on the part of producers. A
merchant will set her price at 1 or the highest price at which clients return
(supPR) depending on whether it is more proﬁtable to act as a bandit and
take her clients’ entire endowment, or to induce her clients to return when
they remember her location.
10A producer is indiﬀerent between trading at a price of 1 and declining trade and
foregoing consumption. However, an outcome in which a producer declines trade cannot
be sustained as an equilibrium since his merchant would be better oﬀ lowering the price
slightly.
12Lemma 3.3 (Optimal Pricing). Given a return decision rule for the in-
formed producers, characterized by PR, a merchant’s best response is to set





supPR if supPR > 1 − γδ
supPR or 1 if supPR = 1 − γδ
1 if supPR < 1 − γδ or PR = ∅.
(9)
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind the lemma is transparent. First, it cannot be op-
timal for a merchant to set a price other than supPR or 1 since she can
increase her current period proﬁt, without aﬀecting the return-decision of
any client, by raising her price slightly. Next, suppose a merchant deviates
from the constant price sequence of supPR for one period and charges a
price of 1. She would gain 1 − supPR from each client in that period, but
lose her client base. The expected discounted loss on each client is 1/(1−γδ).
The lemma follows from a comparison of these magnitudes.
By Lemma 3.3, at an intermediation equilibrium, supPR ≥ 1 − γδ; and
if supPR > 1−γδ, merchants set a constant price p = supPR and informed
producers return to their merchants.
We next compute the optimal return decision rule for informed produc-
ers. Consider a conﬁguration (p,m) in which all m merchants charge a
constant price p in each period. Let V r(p,m) denote the expected contin-
uation payoﬀ of an informed producer who returns to his merchant and let
V s(p,m) denote the corresponding expected continuation value of a pro-
ducer who searches. Then, V r(p,m) and V s(p,m) are given by
V r(p,m) = (1 − p) + δ

(1 − γ)V s(p,m) + γV r(p,m)

(10)
V s(p,m) = λs(1 + δV s(p,m)) + λmV r(p,m) + (1 − λm − λs)δV s(p,m).
(11)
A returning producer concludes trade immediately with his merchant at the
price p, consumes 1 − p, and returns again with another unit next period
with probability γ. With probability 1 − γ he forgets his information and
must search. This yields equation (10). A searcher encounters another
searcher with probability λs, trades units one for one, and will again search
in the following period. With probability λm he ﬁnds a trading post with a
merchant charging price p, and then is precisely in the same position as a
returning producer. With probability 1−λm−λs he does not ﬁnd a trading
partner during the period, receives no utility, and returns as a searcher next
period. This yields equation (11).
The solutions to equations (10) and (11) yield the continuation values
13for the informed and uninformed producers:
V r(p,m) =
(1 − γ)δλs + [1 − δ(1 − λm)](1 − p)
(1 − δ)

1 − γδ(1 − λm)
 (12)
V s(p,m) =
(1 − γδ)λs + λm(1 − p)
(1 − δ)

1 − γδ(1 − λm)
. (13)
Let p∗(m) denote the price at which V r(p,m) equals V s(p,m). Then we
have
p∗(m) =
1 − λm − λs
1 − λm . (14)
We provide a precise interpretation of p∗(m) below.
Suppose an individual merchant sets a price p0 every period while all
other merchants charge a price p ∈ PR. Then the continuation value of an
informed client who decides to return to this merchant in each period that
he is informed is:
¯ V r(p0|p,m) = (1 − p0) + δ

(1 − γ)V s(p,m) + γ ¯ V r((p0|p,m)

(15)
from which we can solve for ¯ V r(p0|p,m) in terms of V s(p,m) and p0. ¯ V r is
decreasing in p0 as expected.
Deﬁne f(p,m) to be the value of p0 which equates ¯ V r((p0|p,m) and
V s(p,m). Some algebra yields
f(p,m) =
(1 − γδ)(1 − λm − λs) + pλm
1 − γδ(1 − λm)
. (16)
For any p0 lower than f(p,m) the client is better oﬀ returning to the
merchant, while at a higher price he would do better to search. The client
is exactly indiﬀerent between returning and searching when p0 = f(p,m).
When all merchants set the same price p, an informed producer is indiﬀerent
between searching and returning to his merchant if p = f(p,m). From (16),






1 − γδ(1 − λm)
=
λm
λm + (1 − γδ)(1 − λm)
∈ (0,1)
Thus p R p∗(m) ⇒ p R f(p,m), which leads to the following observation.
Observation 3.1. Suppose there are m merchants and each merchant
charges a price p. Informed producers prefer to return to their merchants
rather than search if and only if p ≤ p∗(m). Further, if p < p∗(m) then an
individual merchant can raise her price slightly without aﬀecting this return
decision.
14Lemma 3.4 (Intermediation Pricing). With ﬁxed occupational choices and




1 − λm. (17)
Moreover, only two stationary price paths can arise as outcomes of interme-
diation equilibria:
p = 1 − γδ, and p = p∗(m) =
1 − λm − λs
1 − λm .
proof : See Appendix.
The above lemmata establish that only three stationary price paths can
arise as outcomes along an equilibrium path when occupational choice is
ﬁxed. One is the static pure monopoly price of 1 that we have termed
the bandit price. Another is the lowest (symmetric) price compatible with
repeated interaction: 1 − γδ, where the clients appropriate the entire infor-
mation rent. A merchant is better oﬀ acting as a bandit than charging a
lower price to attract repeat clients. We refer to 1 − γδ as the competitive
intermediation price. The third is the highest (symmetric) price compatible
with repeated interaction: p∗(m). At this price, the merchant appropriates
the entire information rent from her clients. At any higher price, informed
producers are better oﬀ searching than returning to their merchants. This
can be thought of as the monopoly price in the context of a repeated rela-
tionship: we refer to it as the monopoly intermediation price.
The analysis of the monopoly price extends the classic model of search
by Diamond (1971) to a repeated environment and incorporates a paral-
lel search market. As in Diamond’s model, each merchant enjoys local
monopoly; but here the monopoly power is tempered by the coexistence
of the search market. The highest price at which a merchant has returning
clients is less than the static pure monopoly price of unity, which would be
the equilibrium in Diamond’s framework.11
We have modeled the merchants as price-setters. In an alternative for-
mulation, the price could be determined through Nash bargaining between a
merchant and a producer as in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) or Masters
(2007). Each party would then retain some of the gains from reduced search
costs.
11The model of competition among merchants here is qualitatively similar to models of
sequential search without recall. In models of sequential search, an agent who encounters
an unacceptable price simply defers consumption and continues to search—the cost of
additional search may be a delay in consumption or represented as a ﬁxed amount. In our
model, the cost of a bad search outcome is a reduction in current period consumption.
The agent (producer) trades at the unfavourable price, consumes, and resumes search next
period with a new unit of the good.
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4.1 Occupational Choice
Assume a given stationary conﬁguration (p,m) in which a measure m
of merchants set a constant price p ∈ PR. An agent who was a producer
at t − 1, and decides to start up as a merchant at t, will begin with no
established client base and must acquire clients over time. (Some of the
searching population in period t, t+1,... will chance upon her trading post.)
A continuing merchant may also ﬁnd herself with no clients, since it is
possible that all her clients may forget her location. The continuation value
of such an incipient merchant is V µ(0,p,m), deﬁned in Observation 2.3.
A new merchant must start trading with an inventory of 1 − p that she
uses to fund her ﬁrst trade. Since a merchant does not produce, this in-
ventory must come from unconsumed output carried over from the previous
period. Similarly, a merchant in t − 1 who decides to become a producer in
t can consume an extra 1−p in period t−1 which she would otherwise have
carried as inventory.
The next lemma identiﬁes the restrictions imposed by the requirement
that the occupational choices of agents are optimal in equilibrium.
Lemma 4.1 (Occupational Choice). At a stationary conﬁguration (p,m),
the occupational choice of each agent is optimal at every period t if and only
if
δV µ(0,p,m) = δV s(p,m) + (1 − p). (18)
Proof. A producer who decides at t − 1 to start up as a merchant at t can
obtain the continuation value δV µ(0,p,m), but he must sacriﬁce 1 − p of
consumption at t − 1. Correspondingly, a merchant who decides at t − 1 to
switch to production at t will start as an uninformed producer and obtain
the continuation value δV s(p,m), but she can consume at t − 1 her current
inventory of 1 − p that would have funded her next trade.
Thus if δV µ(0,p,m) − (1 − p) > δV s(p,m), a positive measure of unin-
formed producers will want to start up as merchants but no merchant will
want to switch to production.12 Conversely, if δV µ(0,p,m) < δV s(p,m) +
(1 − p), a positive measure of merchants will have an incentive to switch
to production, but no producer will have an incentive to become a mer-
chant. In either case, the measure of merchants cannot remain constant.
Condition (18) negates these two possibilities, and ensures that each agent’s
occupational choice is optimal at any t.
12It is not necessary to explicitly consider switches by informed producers, since these
must have a continuation value bounded below by V
s.
164.2 Equilibria
Proposition 4.1 below combines Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 4.1 to provide a
complete characterization of all equilibria in which some but not all agents
are merchants.
Deﬁnition 4.1. We deﬁne three strategy proﬁles that will feature in the
characterization of equilibria. The three proﬁles diﬀer in their speciﬁcations
of pricing and return decision rules. They share in common the part of the
proﬁle concerning occupational choice. For all three proﬁles,
(?) agents in a subset of measure m ∈ (0,1) always specialize as merchants;
the remaining agents always specialize as producers.
A bandit strategy proﬁle is one in which
• (?) holds,
• each producer always searches (i.e., PR is empty),
• each merchant always sets the price pt = 1 in every period t.
A monopoly intermediation strategy proﬁle is one in which
• (?) holds,
• the informed producers’ return decision rule is given by PR = [0,p∗(m)],
• a merchant’s pricing rule is given by (9).
A competitive intermediation strategy proﬁle is one in which
• (?) holds,
• the informed producers’ return decision rule is given by PR = [0,1 − γδ],
• each merchant sets pt = 1 − γδ if she had set pt−1 ≤ 1 − γδ, and sets
pt = 1 otherwise.
Proposition 4.1 (Equilibria). (a) A bandit strategy proﬁle constitutes an







(b) A monopoly intermediation strategy proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium
if and only if (17) holds and
1 − γδ =
δ (1 − λm − λs)λm s
λs m
. (20)
(c) A competitive intermediation strategy proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium




γδλm + (1 − γδ)λs
(1 − γδ)(1 + λm)
+ (1 − δ)γ (21)
proof: See Appendix.
17The intuition behind Proposition 4.1 is as follows. If occupational choices
remain invariant between periods, then m is constant over time. By Lemma
3.3 there are then exactly three prices that can be supported in equilib-
rium. By Lemma 3.4, two of these prices—the “monopoly” and ”compet-
itive” prices that yield intermediation equilibria—are incentive compatible
for merchants if and only if Condition (17) is satisﬁed. Finally, Condition
(18) ensures that continuing with invariant occupational choices is incentive-
compatible for each individual agent. Thus occupational choices do remain
invariant, and Lemma 3.3 can be applied.
In Proposition 4.1, the bandit equilibrium is determined by substituting
the bandit price p = 1 into Condition (18) and imposing the additional con-
dition that all producers search irrespective of their information state. Thus
modiﬁed, Condition (18) then implicitly determines the measure of mer-
chants m in a bandit equilibrium. The monopoly equilibrium and the com-
petitive equilibrium are determined by substituting the appropriate prices
p∗(m) and 1 − γδ into Condition (18) together with the requirement that
informed producers return to their merchants. In each case, the modiﬁed
Condition (18) then implicitly determines the measure of merchants. Fur-
ther, Condition (17) must hold in the intermediation equilibria.
Finally, at each intermediation equilibrium price there is one set of agents
that is indiﬀerent between the equilibrium action and an alternative action.
In monopoly, informed producers are indiﬀerent between return and search,
and in the competitive equilibrium merchants are indiﬀerent between charg-
ing the equilibrium price and the bandit price. This indiﬀerence is used to
support the appropriate actions oﬀ the equilibrium path in the equilibrium
strategy proﬁles.
The friction in the decision to change occupation, embodied in the proba-
bility α > 0 introduced earlier, did not play any part in the results presented
in this or earlier sections. In fact, its role is to rule out a class of equilibria
that we ﬁnd less than convincing. These are precisely equilibria in which the
price lies strictly between the the competitive price and the monopoly price.
Below we establish the unique strategy proﬁle that can support these prices
in equilibrium, and show that these equilibria vanish when the friction α is
positive.
Consider a pair (¯ p, ¯ m) that satisﬁes the condition (18), which must nec-
essarily hold in equilibrium. Deﬁne the strategy proﬁle ¯ σ as follows:
• Producers set PR = [0, ¯ p],
• Merchants set pt = ¯ p in each period t; if a merchant sets pt > ¯ p in any t,
then in t + 1 the merchant changes occupation and becomes a producer.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose ¯ p > 1−γδ, informed producers use the return decision
18rule PR = [0, ¯ p], and ¯ m is such that (¯ p, ¯ m) satisﬁes condition (18). Then
it is optimal for each agent who is a merchant in period t to set pt = ¯ p,
regardless of history.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose (¯ p, ¯ m) satisﬁes condition (18), ¯ p < p∗(¯ m), and each
agent who is a merchant in period t sets pt = ¯ p. Then it is optimal for
informed producers to set PR = [0, ¯ p] only if merchants that deviated in
period t and set pt > ¯ p change occupation and become producers in period
t + 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Thus if a price strictly between the competitive and monopoly prices
is supported in equilibrium, then the equilibrium strategy proﬁle must be
¯ σ described above. Proposition 4.2 below shows that such a price can be
supported as an equilibrium if and only if the decision to change occupation
is frictionless.
Proposition 4.2. A conﬁguration (¯ p, ¯ m) that solves (18) can be supported
as an equilibrium if and only if α = 0.
proof: See Appendix 1.
Thus equilibria that support prices in the interval between the compet-
itive price and the monopoly price are not robust in the sense that they
vanish if there is any friction in the decision to change occupations. We
ignore these equilibria in the remainder of the paper.
Proposition 4.3. There are at most three classes of equilibria in the econ-
omy with α > 0. These are the ones deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4.1.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3 It is never optimal for merchants to charge a price
strictly less than 1 − γδ, regardless of the return rule used by producers.
Given m, producers will not return at prices higher than p∗(m), hence it is
also suboptimal to charge prices in the interior of (p∗(m),1). Thus the only
candidates for equilibrium prices are prices in the interval [1 − γδ,p∗(m)],
and unity. The proof then follows from Propositions 4.1 and 4.2.
5 Closed-Form Solutions
In our analysis so far, the matching functions λm and λs were quite
arbitrary. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on a speciﬁc pair of
matching functions in the interest of gaining further insight and obtaining
19closed-form expressions for the equilibrium values of some key variables.
The matching functions we focus on are given by
λm(m,s) =
λm1/2
m1/2 + s1/2 (22)
λs(m,s) =
λs1/2
m1/2 + s1/2, λ ∈ (0,1). (23)
Observe that merchants and producers are treated symmetrically by the
matching technology: merchants enjoy no a priori advantage in this respect.
The matching functions are also homogeneous of degree 0 so that there are
no thick-market externalities.
Using the search functions in (22) and (23), we ﬁnd existence conditions
for each of the three types of equilibria outlined in Proposition 4.1 in terms of
the parameters of the model (γ, δ, and λ). We also determine the equilibrium
price at these equilibria and the equilibrium measure of merchants at the
bandit and monopoly intermediation equilibria.13
Proposition 5.1 (Closed-Form Solutions). Let the matching functions λm
and λs be given by (22) and (23). Then,
(a) A unique bandit equilibrium always exists. At this equilibrium, p = 1,
and the measure of agents specializing as merchants is given by m = 1/2.
(b) A monopoly intermediation equilibrium exists if and only if
γδ2(1 − λ)2 ≥ (1 − γδ)(λ − γδ). (24)
If it exists, it is unique. The measure of agents specializing as merchants is
given by
m∗ =
(1 − γ)(1 + a1/2)




δ2(1 − λ)2; (26)
and the price set by each merchant in every period is given by
p∗ =
δ(1 − λ)2 + (1 − λ)(1 − γδ)
δ(1 − λ)2 + (1 − γδ)
. (27)
(c) If γδ ≥ λ, a competitive intermediation equilibrium exists. If it exists,
it is unique. At this equilibrium, p = 1 − γδ and m ∈ (0, 1
2).
13We omit the long and uninformative closed-form expression for m in the competitive
equilibrium.
20Proof: See Appendix.
The proof consists of using the particular matching functions (22) and
(23) in the conditions derived in Proposition 4.1—in particular, inequality
(17), and the equations(19), (20), (21).
Observation 5.1. (i) There is a threshold value λ∗ ∈ (γδ,1) such that
the economy has a monopoly intermediation equilibrium if and only if
λ ≤ λ∗.
(ii) The condition in part (c) is suﬃcient but not necessary.
(iii) It follows from parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 5.1 that both a monopoly
and a competitive intermediation equilibrium exist when γδ ≥ λ.
Proof of (i). Rewrite (24) as
φ(λ) ≡ γδ2(1 − λ)2 − (1 − γδ)(λ − γδ) ≥ 0 (28)
Inequality (28) is strict for γδ ≥ λ. Also, we have φ0 < 0 for all λ ∈ [0,1],
and φ(1) = −(1−γδ)2 < 0. Since φ is continuous, the existence of λ∗ in the
remark is assured.
The intuition is transparent: for intermediation equilibria to exist, the
rate at which searchers can be found cannot be too high compared to the
rate at which former clients return to their merchants. Otherwise, it would
be more proﬁtable for merchants to act as bandits than to induce clients to
return.
6 Welfare
Merchants in this model provide a beneﬁcial trading externality: an en-
counter with a merchant opens up the prospect of a long-term relationship
for future trade, and potentially reduces search costs. However, specializa-
tion by merchants in the service of exchange comes at the expense of the pro-
duction of the physical good. Merchants also create negative externalities—
as the measure of merchants rises, the search market gets thinner aﬀecting
the trade prospects of the searching population. Also, the clientele of a new
merchant in steady-state is not drawn entirely from the hitherto searching
population; some of her clients would otherwise have been clients of the
merchants already in the market.
A natural measure of social welfare here is the expected aggregate con-
sumption per period. How does welfare at an equilibrium with merchants
compare with an economy with no merchants? What is the optimal measure
of merchants in the economy? Is the equilibrium measure of merchants opti-
mal? This section addresses these questions in the context of the closed-form
economy described in Section 5.
21It is obvious that the bandit equilibrium outcome is worse for welfare
than an economy with no merchants: bandits do not produce; nor do they
reduce search cost for other agents.
Suppose that the economy is in steady-state with m merchants who set
a price p ∈ PR. Then, the size of the set of uninformed agents is given by
equation (8). With m merchants, 1 − m units are produced in a period; of
these, a fraction (1 − λm − λs)s fails to get traded and consumed. Letting
W denote the welfare, we have
W(m) = 1 − m − (1 − λm − λs) s(m). (29)
Proposition 6.1 and Observation 6.1 demonstrate that the welfare asso-
ciated with an intermediation equilibrium may be higher or lower than the
welfare associated with a pure-search economy.
Proposition 6.1 (Welfare). Let the matching functions be given by (22)
and (23).
(a) Welfare is maximized at an interior measure ˜ m of merchants. At ˜ m,




(b) The welfare associated with the monopoly intermediation equilibrium
characterized in Proposition 5.1(b) is greater than the welfare in the
pure-search economy if and only if
γ(1 − γδ)2 > (1 − γ)[(1 − γδ) + (1 − λ)]. (31)
proof: See Appendix.
Observation 6.1. Condition (31) holds for a wide range of parameter val-
ues that are consistent with Proposition 5.1 (b). For example, try γ =
9/10, δ = 5/8, λ = 9/16. Note that λ = γδ, so the existence condition is
satisﬁed. Similarly, there are also ranges of values for which an intermedi-
ation equilibrium exists, but condition (31) does not hold. Thus in general
there is no correspondence between equilibria and optima, or even a pre-
sumption that welfare at an equilibrium is necessarily greater than in the
pure-search economy.
7 The Rise of Merchants
Suppose that we start with an economy in which all agents specialize as
producers. Under what conditions can we expect an institution of interme-
diation to endogenously arise in this economy? We show below that, if γ is
22suﬃciently large, then it will be strictly proﬁtable for an arbitrarily small
positive measure of producers to deviate and set up as merchants. Below
we interpret an increase in γ as a consequence of increasing maturity and
stability in civil society. In this interpretation, as society progresses from its
“early and rude state”, intermediation arises endogenously and merchants
replace bandits and pirates.
Consider therefore an economy in which each agent specializes as a pro-
ducer every period, and searches for trading partners. Each agent’s per-
period payoﬀ is λs(0,1) = λ. Let each producer’s return-decision-rule, when
informed, be given by PR = [0,1 − λ].
Now, suppose a small measure of agents deviates, starts up as merchants,
and sets a price less than 1 − λ. Producers who come upon their trading
posts will want to return. Thus the merchants, beginning with a client base
of zero, will acquire clients over time. Proposition 7.1 below shows that this
deviation is proﬁtable provided that a merchant’s retention rate of clients,
γ, is suﬃciently high relative to λ.
Proposition 7.1 (Emergence of Merchants). Let the matching functions
be speciﬁed by (22) and (23), and let γδ > λ. Suppose that each agent’s
strategy is to specialize as producer in every period and, if informed, use the
return-rule PR = [0,1 − λ].
(a) There exists ¯ m ∈ (0,1) such that, for all m0 ∈ (0, ¯ m), any subset of
agents of measure m0 would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to start up as merchants
and set a price ˜ p ∈ [1 − γδ,1 − λ].
(b) The payoﬀs of deviating merchants increases without bound as m0 → 0.
Proof. Let a subset of agents of measure m simultaneously start up as mer-
chants and set a price ˜ p ∈ [1−γδ,1−λ] every period. Since γδ > λ, ˜ p ∈ PR.
Then, the continuation value of this deviation for an individual merchant is
given by
V µ(0, ˜ p,m) =
˜ p λm(m,1 − m)(1 − m)
(1 − δ)(1 − γδ)m
, [see (36)]
=
˜ p λ(1 − m)
(1 − δ)(1 − γδ)










, for m < 1/4, since m1/2(1 − m)1/2 ≤ 1/2. (33)
The condition γδ > λ also ensures that supPR > 1 − γδ; thus, the payoﬀ
for the deviating agents who become merchants is higher than their payoﬀ
if they were to become bandits (see Lemma 3.3). This, in conjunction with
inequality (33), establishes part (a).
23Moreover, from (32), V µ(0, ˜ p,m) increases without bound as m → 0
which is part (b).
Observation 7.1. If ˜ p ∈ (1−γδ,1−λ), the deviation makes all agents—not
only those in the deviating subset—strictly better oﬀ.
The prospect of an endogenous rise of an institution of intermediation
ab initio thus depends on the relative values of the parameters γ and λ (for
a ﬁxed δ). These parameters, in turn, are arguably determined by social
and technological conditions.
Exchange for personal consumption between producers has occurred
since prehistory within local circles, and formed the basis for division of
labor and specialization in village economies. The ambit of such exchange,
for which λ is a proxy, is likely to remain limited and evolve slowly over
time.
The parameter γ, which captures the ability of merchants to communi-
cate with their clients and of the clients to return to their merchants, is likely
to be more sensitive to social, political, and technological conditions. Com-
munication and commerce may be rendered impossible between one period
and the next by natural calamities or bandits or unreliable transportation;
rulers may prevent access or impose tolls; local wars may intervene. Viewed
in this way, γ is likely to rise with improvements in law and order and in the
technology of communication and transport. Thus, farsighted merchants
are unlikely to thrive in primitive and unmoderated societies; they appear
only when some modicum of public security has already been established.
When order deteriorates in established societies, disrupting communication
and transportation networks, even erstwhile reliable merchants may turn to
banditry; but professionally mediated trade arises again as the rule of law
is restored and communication improves.14
8 Conclusion
Intermediaries perform many roles in facilitating trade. They may var-
iously exploit advantages in the technology of transaction and trade, costs
of storing inventory, aggregating information, assessing quality of goods or
some attributes of agents or a market, matchmaking, and so forth. We fo-
cused on only two aspects that are interrelated in our model—reducing the
cost of search, and fostering long-term trading relationships with clients.
14This interpretation is not inconsistent with European history. In the second half of
the ﬁrst millennium AD there was a general decline of law and order, accompanied by a
contraction of trade. As stability was re-established and the rule of law gained ascendancy
in the second millennium, professional merchants ﬂourished and trade expanded as well,
both within Europe and across the Mediterranean.
24Our primary objective was to develop a self-contained, if rudimentary, ac-
count of an emergent institution of intermediation. Thus, the important
modeling concern was to start with a homogeneous population, endogenize
the choice between the two occupations of production and intermediation,
and investigate the conﬁguration of parameters that predicate the rise of
intermediation as a sustainable occupation.
In focusing on these, we have marginalized several other concerns that
may legitimately claim attention in the context of this paper. We brieﬂy
comment on some of these below.
We suppose that the price at which a producer trades with a merchant
is set by the merchant. In our model, this results in either the merchant or
the producer extracting all the rent in equilibrium. In an alternative for-
mulation, the price could be determined through Nash bargaining between
a merchant and a producer, with the consequence that both parties would
retain some of the gains from reduced search costs.
Our treatment of competition among merchants is minimalist. In partic-
ular, a producer knows at most one merchant; he cannot maintain his link
with a merchant and simultaneously search for a better price. It may be of
interest to investigate the consequences of allowing producers to randomly
observe a second price, as in Burdett and Coles (1997). It is worth reiterat-
ing, however, that even the simple model elaborated here incorporates the
full extent of competition that is aﬀorded by standard models of sequential
search without recall (see Footnote 11).
The present model is one of pure exchange: the production process is en-
tirely mechanistic in that it involves no choice variable. As Diamond (1982)
has shown in a model of search, reducing anticipated delays in exchange
can inﬂuence production decisions. In future work, we plan to extend the
present model by incorporating production to yield richer general equilib-
rium interactions. This would also provide the bridge between the analysis
of the microstructure of exchange and the formulation of macroeconomic
policy, which was the intention of Diamond’s original article.
25Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Fix a return decision rule PR. No price other than
supPR or 1 can optimal: a merchant can increase her current period proﬁt,
without aﬀecting the return-decision of any client, by raising her price
slightly.
We start with the price sequence pt = supPR for every period t, and show
that the merchant cannot gain by deviating from this sequence if supPR >
1 − γδ.
Step 1: Consider a one-period deviation in some period τ in which the
merchant sets pτ = 1 (the best one-period deviation). The merchant’s net














∆1 < 0 since supPR > 1 − γδ. Thus if there is a proﬁtable deviation from
the constant sequence supPR, then the price must deviate from supPR in
at least two periods.15
Step 2: So let τ be a period in which pτ = 1 and τ0 = τ +n the next period
such that pτ0 = 1, with pt = supPR for the intermediate periods τ < t < τ0
(there may be no such intermediate periods).
Now replace pτ with supPR, and calculate the change in the merchant’s
proﬁt. The merchant loses kτ(1 − supPR) in period τ owing to the lower
price she charges. However, of these kτ producers, the ones that remain
informed return in the periods τ + 1,...,τ + n, which they would not have
done if the merchant had charged pτ. The merchant’s net gain discounted
to period τ is:
∆2 = kτ(1 − supPR) +
τ+n−1 X
t=τ+1
(γδ)t−τ supPRkτ + (γδ)nkτ











which is positive since supPR > 1−γδ. Thus the merchant’s proﬁt increases
if she sets pτ = supPR.
15We consider multi-period deviations below: it is not obvious that the single-deviation
property applies to this game.
26By Step 1 and Step 2, if supPR > 1 − γδ, then the merchant’s proﬁt is
maximized by setting pt = supPR in each period t.
Using an analogous argument, when supPR < 1 − γδ it is optimal to set
pt = 1 in each period. When supPR = 1−γδ, the merchant, in each period,
is indiﬀerent between setting pt = supPR and setting pt = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Consider an intermediation equilibrium with price p.
From Observation 3.1 we know that clients will ﬁnd it suboptimal to return
to their merchants if p > f(p,m), thus we must have p ≤ f(p,m) ⇐⇒ p ≤
p∗(m). By Lemma 3.3 we know that merchants strictly prefer to charge a
price of unity rather than p < 1 − γδ. Hence p ≥ 1 − γδ. Thus we must
have p∗(m) ≥ 1 − γδ which is restated as condition (17). This establishes
necessity.
By Lemma 3.3, we must have ˆ p = supPR ≥ 1 − γδ in an intermediation
equilibrium.
If supPR = 1 − γδ, then each merchant is indiﬀerent between setting p =
supPR and p = 1 in each period. Let the return strategy of the producer be
given by PR = [0, 1−γδ] and the (symmetric) pricing rule of each merchant
be to set pt = 1 − γδ if she had set pt−1 ≤ 1 − γδ, and pt = 1 if she had set
pt−1 > 1−γδ. This is a best response to the producers’ return strategy PR,
and the return strategy is a best response to the pricing rule.16
Suppose all merchants charge a price p in the interior of the interval (1 −
γδ, p∗(ˆ m)). By Observation 3.1, p 6= supPR, since an informed producer
will prefer to return to his merchant even if that merchant slightly raises her
price. Thus a price p ∈ (1 − γδ,p∗(ˆ m)) cannot obtain in an intermediation
equilibrium with given ˆ m.17
Finally consider p = p∗(m). If all merchants charge this price then an
informed producer is indiﬀerent between return and search; at any higher
price he will search. So let each informed producer return if his merchant
charges p ≤ p∗(m), and search otherwise. Note that this is weakly optimal
even if the merchant is expected to revert to p∗(m) after a deviation. Let
merchants set p = p∗(m). This is a best response (strictly so if p∗(m) >
1 − γδ) to the producers’ return strategy PR, and the return strategy is a
best response to the pricing rule.
This establishes suﬃciency and the speciﬁc equilibria, and conﬁrms that
there are no other equilibria.
16Note that if 1 − γδ < p
∗(ˆ m), then in equilibrium the merchant’s strategy cannot
specify reversion to 1 − γδ after a deviation, for then the clients will ﬁnd it optimal to
return.
17This is not true if the friction α vanishes, and agents can change occupation (see
Proposition 4.2)
27Proof of Proposition 4.1. Lemma 3.4 shows that the pricing decisions of
merchants and the return decisions of producers given in (a)–(c) of Deﬁni-
tion 4.1 are the only ones that are consistent with equilibrium if occupational
choices remain invariant between periods. Condition (18) ensures that no
agent can beneﬁt by changing occupation, so that invariant occupational
choices remain weakly optimal. The proof combines these two conditions.
(a) If agents follow the bandit strategy proﬁle, we have s = 1−m at every t,
and a merchant extracts a price of unity from each of the λm(m,1−m)[1−
m]/m of searching producers who come upon her trading post. Further,
since informed clients don’t return, every merchant is in the same position
as one who served no clients in the previous period. Thus, for any merchant
µ at every t
V µ(0,1,m) =
λm(m,1 − m)(1 − m)
(1 − δ)m
. (34)
Further, at the given strategy proﬁle, the continuation value at any t for





Noting that in the bandit strategy p = 1 and applying Lemma 4.1, we obtain
(19).
(b) If agents follow the monopoly intermediation strategy proﬁle, using





(1 − λm − λs)λms
(1 − δ)(1 − γδ)(1 − λm)m
. (36)






(1 − δ)(1 − λm)
. (37)
Condition (20) is obtained by substituting the continuation values from (36)
and (37) in Condition (18). Condition (17) follows from equation (14) and
the requirement that p ≥ 1 − γδ in an intermediation equilibrium (Lemma
3.3).
(c) Condition (21) is obtained by substituting 1−γδ for the price in equa-
tion (6) and equation (13), and using the resulting continuation values in
Condition (18). Condition (17) ensures that the price 1−γδ does not exceed
the monopoly price derived in (14), for otherwise informed producers would
choose not to return to their merchants.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Clearly it is never optimal to set pt < ¯ p. If a merchant
charges pt > ¯ p, then it is optimal to charge pt = 1. If she does so, then
28she will have no returning clients in t + 1, so she is indiﬀerent between
continuing as a merchant in period t + 1 (with no returning clients) and
becoming a producer (by condition (18)). Hence it is suﬃcient to show that
charging pt = ¯ p and continuing as a merchant dominates charging pt = 1
and continuing as a merchant. By Lemma 3.3, this follows from ¯ p > 1 − γδ
and the fact that the merchant expects a strictly positive number of clients
E(kt) ≥ sλm
¯ m > 0 in period t, regardless of history.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Suppose informed producers set PR = [0, ¯ p]. Then
by Lemma 4.2 it is strictly optimal for each merchant in period t to set
pt = ¯ p, even if she had deviated in the previous period. Since ¯ p < p∗(¯ m),
it is therefore strictly optimal for an informed producer to return to his
merchant in each period that he expects the merchant to be present at her
trading-post, even if the merchant deviated in the previous period and set
p > ¯ p. Hence PR = [0, ¯ p] cannot be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. By Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, the only subgame-perfect
strategy proﬁle that is consistent with an equilibrium conﬁguration (¯ p, ¯ m),
with ¯ p ∈ (1−γδ,p∗(¯ m)), is one in which merchants change occupation after
charging a price higher than ¯ p, and clients do not return if the merchant
charges a price higher than ¯ p because they expect the merchant to cease
operating as a merchant. The clients’ return rule must of course be corre-
spondingly speciﬁed. This gives precisely the strategy proﬁle ¯ σ.
However, suppose that the strategy proﬁle is ¯ σ, and α > 0. consider a
merchant who charged pt > ¯ p. With probability α, she will be unable to
change occupation and will continue as a producer in t + 1. Even though
she does not expect her former clients to return, by Lemma 4.2 it is optimal
for her to charge pt+1 = ¯ p.
Now consider her former clients. In period t + 1 they can go directly to the
search market, which yields expected continuation value V s(¯ p, ¯ m). Alter-
natively, they can ﬁrst visit the merchant’s post and then proceed to the
search market if the merchant is indeed not present, which yields expected
value α(1 − ¯ p) + (1 − α)V s(¯ p, ¯ m). But since ¯ p < p∗(¯ m), it follows that
(1 − ¯ p) > V s(¯ p, ¯ m), hence the second strategy is strictly optimal.
Thus if α > 0 it is optimal for an informed producer to return to his mer-
chant’s post in t+1 even if the merchant set pt > ¯ p, thus PR = [0, ¯ p] cannot
be optimal for informed producers, and ¯ σ cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. (a) Using (22) and (23) in (19) and recognizing
29that s = 1 − m at a bandit equilibrium, we get
λm1/2(1 − m)
m1/2 + (1 − m)1/2 =
λ(1 − m)1/2m
m1/2 + (1 − m)1/2,
which reduces to m = 1/2. This proves part (a).
(b) Simplify(20) to obtain
δ(1 − λs − λm)λms − (1 − γδ)λsm = 0 (38)






Using (22) and (23) in (17), we get
γδ ≥
λs1/2












δ2(1 − λ)2. (41)
Deﬁning a = s
m gives the value of a in (26).
Using a = s
m, (22) reduces to
λm =
λ
1 + a1/2, (42)
and (8) becomes
am =







which yields the value m∗ in terms of the parameters given in (25). It is
easily seen that m∗ ∈ (0,1).
Finally, (27) follows from substituting (22), (23) and (39) in (14).






















30Thus, whenever γδ ≥ λ, (17) is satisﬁed.
Using (22) and (23) and letting b = m1/2




γδλb + (1 − γδ)λ
(1 − γδ)(b + 1) + γδλb
− γ(1 − δ) = 0. (43)
Which is a function of b and the parameters. Cross-multiplying and collect-
ing terms, (43) can be written as
ψ(b) ≡ Ab3 + Bb2 + Cb + D = 0, (44)
where
A = − [γδλ + (1 − γδ)(1 − δ)γ + (1 − δ)γ2δλ] < 0,
B = − [(1 − γδ)λ + γδλ + 2(1 − γδ)(1 − δ)γ + (1 − δ)γ2δλ] < 0,
C =γδλ2 − (1 − δ)(1 − γδ)γ,
D =λ(1 − γδ) > 0.
Since ψ00(b) = 6Ab + 2B < 0 for b ≥ 0, ψ is strictly concave for b ≥ 0.
Moreover, ψ(0) = D > 0, and it is easy to verify that ψ(1) < 0. It follows
that (44) has a unique solution for b ≥ 0, and the solution occurs in the
range b ∈ (0,1). Observe that in this range, 0 < m < s(m) ≤ (1−m) which
implies that m ∈ (0, 1
2). Thus, (21) always has a unique positive solution
which occurs for some m ∈ (0, 1
2). Further, γδ ≥ λ is suﬃcient to ensure
that this is a competitive equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. (a) Using equations (22) and (23) in (29),
W(m) = 1 − m − (1 − λ) s(m). (45)
W(0) = λ and W(m) must fall below λ for values of m in excess of 1 − λ:
at least λ units of output must be produced in the economy for welfare to
exceed λ. Since W is continuous in m, it attains a maximum over [0,1−λ].
We now verify that the derivative of W(m) is positive at m = 0.
From (45), we have
W0(m) = −1 − (1 − λ) s0(m)
so that W0(m) > 0 if s0(m) is negative and larger in absolute value than
1/(1 − λ). Some tedious algebra yields
s0(m) = −
(1 − γ)(m1/2 + s1/2) 2 + (1/2)γλs2/3m−1/2
(1 − γ)(m1/2 + s1/2)2 + γλm1/2 (m1/2 + s1/2) + (1/2)γλm1/2s1/2,
which is negative for all values of s and m between 0 and 1. Using the
fact that s → 1 as m → 0, we ﬁnd that s0(m) increases without bound in
31absolute value as m → 0. Thus, W attains an interior maximum and (30)
follows from the ﬁrst-order condition.
(b) For welfare in the monopoly intermediation equilibrium with m∗ mer-
chants, identiﬁed in Proposition 5.1(b), to be greater than that in the pure-
search economy, we need









Recalling that we deﬁned a = s
m and substituting the value of m∗ from (25),
(46) reduces to
γa(1 − λ) > (1 − γ)(1 + a1/2). (47)
Substituting a =
(1−γδ)2
(1−λ)2 from equation (39) in (47) and simplifying yields
condition (31).
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